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I

The "ethics of belief'' is a much discussed topic in modern and
contemporary philosophy. It is fairly common to see discussion of
what we ought to believe, are warranted in assuming, should
conclude, and so on. Phrases such as these clearly indicate that
morality and epistemology overlap in some very interesting ways.
Indeed, epistemology and ethics converge in many cases in
everyday life when we assess beliefs and judgments in terms of
blame or approval.
Perhaps the most extreme example of assigning blame to beliefs
is in the Christian tradition. A classic passage illustrating this is
Romans l, where Paul says that those who do not believe in God
are morally culpable. But the Christian tradition goes further and
requires more specific beliefs. For instance, the Athanasian Creed
which expounds in detail the doctrines of the Incarnation and
Trinity, begins with this sober claim: "Whoever will be saved,
before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith.
Which Faith except everyone do keep whole and undefiled, without
doubt he shall perish everlastingly." The idea here is that certain
beliefs are essential for salvation, and that those who do not accept
them are damned. Surely damnation is the ultimate form of blame
for wrong belief. Moreover--and most significantly--the notion
that belief is important for salvation can be supported by Christ's
own words. In the Gospel of John, for example, He is reported as
saying "if you do not believe that I am the one I claim to be, you
will indeed die in your sins" (John 8:24).
It is not surprising that this element of Christian teaching has
proven offensive to many. Some would even say that this very
teaching provides a good reason not to believe Christianity. The
idea that one's beliefs about Christ could be culpable strikes some
as simply outrageous.
Richard Robinson expresses this view
pointedly:
It is most important to reject the view that it is a sin not to

believe in Jesus; for the view that a belief can be sinful is
very harmful and wrong. It destroys the whole ideal of
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knowledge and reason, and prevents man from achieving the
knowledge in which much of his dignity and much of his
safety lie . No belief is as such morally wrong; but it is
morally wrong to form one's beliefs in view of something
other than truth and probability; and Jesus demanded this
moral wrong ... .It is terrible to think how many million people
have, as a result of those passages in the gospels about having
faith, done what probably each of us here did in his
childhood, tried to hypnotize himself into some particular
belief and to disregard whatever scraps of judgment he
possessed. The fine things in Jesus' preaching have been and
will be greatly harmed by this blasphemy against reason.1
This passage well expresses the aversion which many have felt to
the Christian view that it is wrong not to believe in Christ.
Robinson's general point is that beliefs as such are not fit subjects
for moral evaluations. No belief is itself wrong in the moral sense.
What is right or wrong is how one forms beliefs. Robinson's view
is that beliefs should be formed in view of truth and probability,
and Christ violated this ideal in demanding belief in Himself. In
his experience, to believe in Christ is to try to "hypnotize" oneself
to so believe, in defiance of what he actually judges to be true .
Given this picture, it is no wonder that many have recoiled from
the idea that one must believe certain things in order to be saved.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that Christian thinkers, too, have
backed away from the claim that beliefs about God and Christ are
blameworthy. Nor should this surprise us, in light of the steady
stream of attacks which have, since the Enlightenment, been
levelled against Christian belief in general.
In previous ages
Christian thinkers were generally confident that it could be known
and shown that God exists, that Christ is His Son, that Christ was
raised from the dead, and so on. Given this confidence, it is easy
to see why those who did not believe were considered
blameworthy, for the evidence for God's existence and other
Christian doctrine was thought to be clear and compelling.
Now, however, it is generally agreed that there is no compelling
argument for God's existence, let alone for the deity of Christ. In
this intellectual climate there is accordingly much greater
For if there is no
reluctance to think unbelief is culpable.
substantial reason to believe in God, there hardly seems to be any
warrant for thinking anyone might be held accountable for
unbelief. Related to this, I suggest, is the quiet abandonment of
the doctrine of hell among Christian thinkers in favor of
universalism.
However, the doctrine of hell remains a thorny problem which
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cannot be so easily ignored. As Peter Geach claims:
We cannot be Christians, followers of Christ, we cannot even
know what it is to be a Christian, unless the Gospels give at
least an approximately correct account of Christ's teaching.
And if the Gospel account is even approximately correct,
then it is perfectly clear that according to that teaching many
men are irretrievably lost.2
And, as we have already noted, Christ has traditionally been
understood as teaching that unbelief is one of the sins which leads
to damnation.
I want to insist that this is an issue which Christian thinkers
must face.
Unless they are willing frankly to argue that the
Christian tradition has misunderstood Christ and is mistaken in
teaching that unbelief is blameworthy, and may even lead to
damnation, they should offer some account of why unbelief is
culpable. For the remainder of this paper I will assume the
Christian tradition is correct in teaching that unbelief is morally
culpable and even leads to damnation.3 I will attempt to defend
and make sense of this claim. My purpose is not to argue for the
existence of God or the truth of Christian doctrine. I only suggest
the lines of argument which underlie the notion that unbelief is
blameworthy.
II

Let us approach this problem by considering in general terms
the fact that we do sometimes judge beliefs to be morally wrong.
The question is, when do we judge a belief to be morally wrong?
Why do we sometimes render this verdict?
Consider a few examples. In the state of Indiana there have
recently been cases of parents who were found guilty in court
because they neglected to get medical care for their children, who
consequently died. An interesting thing about these cases is that
the parents are members of a religious cult which believes that it is
wrong to seek medical attention. Now it may be that what is
blameworthy in these cases is not the belief that it is wrong to seek
medical attention, but the action which follows from it, namely,
keeping children from needed medical care . However, these cases
illustrate one of the reasons why beliefs are sometimes culpable:
because they are the basis for actions. Indeed, the relationship
between belief and action is so intimate that the action cannot be

blamed without also blaming the belief. For the action does not
stand alone. It is a direct consequence of the belief.
Or take the case of a tobacco company executive who denies
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that smoking is hazardous to health. We suspect that his belief is
prompted by financial motives and that he has ignored or
suppressed the substantial evidence that smoking is harmful to our
health .
More directly culpable would be a physician who continues to
use a drug for treatment which research indicates has very negative
side effects. If she has heard of the research, but has not bothered
to check it, we would say she is blameworthy for believing the
drug harmless, especially if it turns out otherwise. We would be
particularly justified in blaming her if she has ample opportunity
for keeping up on the research, but spends all her free time, say,
playing tennis.
It is worth stressing here that, in this case, the physician's belief
is a consequence of an action, namely, neglect of the research .
This contrasts with our example above of the parents whose actions
were the consequence of their belief. These examples illustrate
that there is a two-way street between belief and action and that
beliefs may be blameworthy either because they are the basis of
wrong actions or the consequence of wrong actions.
Now consider the case of a person who hears and believes
v1c10us gossip. Let us say Quine tells Quinn that Quinton is a
fraud and a liar. Suppose also that up to that point, Quinn has had
good reason to believe Quinton is a good and honest man . If
Quinn simply accepts Quine's word and henceforth believes that
Quinton is a fraud and a liar, I think we would blame him for this
belief. We would think he should have investigated the charge
before accepting it. We think beliefs about the character of other
persons are serious matters and should not be arrived at carelessly
or casually .
Think now of a person who is informed of an alleged duty.
Suppose Gray is running for public office and hears from a friend
about the requirement in the law to keep an account of all
campaign expenditures. Suppose further that Gray does not bother
to confirm or disconfirm what is heard. He goes on in the belief
that it is not important to keep such an account. Later, if Gray
runs into trouble with the law for illegal campaign practices, we
would think him culpable for believing it unnecessary to record his
expenditures.
Finally, consider the extreme case of someone who believes
there are no moral distinctions, that the whole idea of morality is
superstitious or just plain silly. Most of us would judge such a
belief to be not only mistaken, but also corrupt. Why is this so?
Alvin Plantinga offers this explanation:
A part of what is involved in our blaming people for holding
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corrupt beliefs, I think, is our supposing that the normal
human condition is to reject them, just as the normal human
condition is to accept modus ponens, say, as valid. We think
a normal human being will find injustice--the sort depicted,
for example, in the story the prophet Nathan told David-despicable and odious. In the face of this natural tendency or
prompting, to accept the view that such behavior is perfectly
proper requires something like a special act of will--a special
act of ill will. Such a person, we think, knows better, chooses
what in some sense he knows to be wrong.4
In this quote, Plantinga puts his finger on one of the main reasons
why we can evaluate beliefs in moral terms: because some beliefs
are chosen. Some of our beliefs are like actions in this sense, and
most would agree that we are responsible for our actions.
But it may be doubted whether our beliefs really are like
actions . For most, if not all, of our actions are under our direct
control. For instance, we voluntarily and directly perform such
actions as turning our head or pointing our finger. But can we
choose to believe things in the same direct way as we perform
basic actions? The answer, I think, is generally no. With respect
to most of our ordinary beliefs we are passive rather than active.
Our perceptual beliefs, for instance, are not chosen . We simply
believe many things as the immediate result of seeing and hearing
the sights and sounds around us. Similarly, we believe many other
things because they seem true to us, apart from any choice we have
made.
So generally we do not directly choose our beliefs. However,
this still leaves open the possibility that we may indirectly choose
what we believe. For instance, if I want to believe a certain
proposition, P, I may cultivate belief in P by performing certain
actions. For instance, I may gather and reflect on evidence which
is relevant to P or read books by people who believe P. I may
consciously try to modify my other beliefs so they are compatible
with P. Eventually, I may find myself believing P.
In a similar vein, consider how someone may cultivate wrong
moral beliefs by making wrong choices. For instance, a person
who performed a number of unjust actions may come to believe
that actions which almost all of us would regard as wrong are
actually right. That person may modify his or her previous moral
beliefs in order to believe-those actions were justified.
Of course, it may be objected that a person would already have

to believe that an unjust action was acceptable in order to perform
it. This points up again that there is a two-way street between
belief and action, and it is not always easy to tell which direction
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the traffic is moving. However, the point still stands, I think , that
we do choose some of our beliefs, if not directly, then indirectly.
With these examples before us, we turn to the more specific
question of how beliefs with respect to God may be blameworthy.
I will deal with this question by considering two well-known
accounts of religious belief in contemporary philosophy of religion,
namely, those represented by Alvin Plantinga and Richard
Swinburne. My main concern is to point out the implications of
each of these concerning our moral obligation to believe in God.
III
Let us begin by considering Plantinga's view that belief in God
may be properly basic. In taking this view, Plantinga is following
a number of Reformed theologians who have held that belief in
God is not inferred or deduced from other beliefs. Rather, it is a
belief which we hold spontaneously like our beliefs "in the
existence of other persons, an external world, or the past."5
Why is this so? The Reformed theologian does not try to argue
that God exists; however, he does give us an account of why we do,
in fact, believe that God exists. In the first place, God has created
us with a strong tendency to believe in Him. Our very nature,
then, accounts for the common persistence among human beings to
believe in God. John Calvin put it this way:

To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of
ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain
understanding of his divine majesty.
Ever renewing its
memory, he repeatedly sheds fresh drops. Since, therefore,
me n one and all perceive that there is a God and that he is
their Maker, they are condemned by their own testimony
because they have failed to honor him and to consecrate their
li ves to his wilJ.6
This quote from Calvin also indicates the second reason Reformed
theologians give for taking belief in God as basic: namely , because
God is "ever renewing" our awareness of His existence through the
witness of nature. The entire world around us is an ever-present
reminder that God exists.
To be more specific, our inclination to believe in God when we
are impressed or affected in certain ways by nature is a
circumstance which justifies or grounds our belief.
Plantinga
e xplains this point by comparing what it is that justifies our
ordinary perceptual beliefs. For example, if I believe I see a tree,
I am justified in this belief because (to use language Plantinga
borrows from Chisholm) I am " appeared to treely." Unless I have
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reason to believe my perceptual equipment is misleading me, this
circumstance justifies my belief that there is a tree before me. I
do not deduce that there is a tree before me. I believe it directly
upon being appeared to treely. That is why it qualifies as a basic
belief.
Belief in God is basic in an analogous way. Not only are we so
made that we immediately believe I see a tree in certain
circumstances, we also naturally believe in God-given certain
conditions. "More precisely, there is in us a disposition to believe
propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this vast
and intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the
flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches
of the universe."7
Plantinga's development of the Reformed view of religious
epistemology is certainly intriguing and demands careful
assessment.
My purpose here, however, is only to ask what
implications this view has for evaluating unbelief in God as
The above quote from Calvin spells out these
blameworthy.
implications quite clearly. As he saw it, not only is there no
excuse for not believing in God, there is no excuse for not living a
!ife of devotion to Him, since He has revealed Himself so clearly to
all of us.
It is not clear how far Plantinga wishes to follow his Reformed
predecessors on this point. The implications of his view, however,
surely point in the direction Calvin took. For if God has created
all of us with a strong inclination to believe in Him, and we are
surrounded by circumstances which renew this tendency, it is hard
to see what more God could do to have us believe in Him without
imposing such belief on us. Of course, it may be suggested that
there are other ways of explaining why belief in God is properly
basic.
But it seems to me that something like the Reformed
account of human nature, and of how the world of nature inclines
us to believe, is required if belief in God as properly basic is to be
adequately accounted for.
If belief in God as properly basic is accounted for in such
terms, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that those who do not
believe in God only do so by an act of will similar to that of
persons who believe there are no moral distinctions. That is to say,
we are pushed toward the conclusion that those who do not believe
in God actually know better, but have chosen not to believe.
Thus, the Reformed account does far more than show that belief
in God can be basic for those who want to believe; it shows that

belief in God is , in fact, basic for all.

In other words, the

conditions which are sufficient to justify belief in God as basic
also d emand belief in God. Those who do not believe in God must
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suppress and deny what all persons naturally believe. Unbelief,
then, is an unnatural condition brought about by a sinful act of
deliberate choice. Therefore, it is culpable.
But is unbelief always culpable? Are there not cases when our
inclination to believe may be thwarted in such a way that we
should not be blamed for unbelief? Suppose a person was inclined
to believe in God and even wanted to believe. But suppose further
that that person was forced to undergo systematic brainwashing by
persons who did not believe in God. In this instance, the person
involved might come not to believe, but it would not be because he
chose not to believe. It would hardly make sense in such a case to
blame the person for unbelief.
And in a similar vein, we can imagine cases where a person
might have good grounds for thinking his belief in God was
illusory. Suppose a person who believed in God was given a
detailed psychoanalytic account of why people believe in God, and
was told that his own belief could be fully explained in such terms,
even though God does not exist. Suppose that upon reflection this
person became convinced that the psychoanalytic account did
accurately describe his belief in God. Maybe he comes to see his
belief in God as nothing more than neurotic wishful thinking. He
would then have some reason to believe his apparent perception of
God was misleading.
Would this person not be irrational to
continue to believe in God? And could he be culpable for giving
up an irrational belief?
The latter case is more ambiguous, for it may be the
psychoanalytic account of belief in God was accepted too easily.
Furthermore, even if belief could be adequately explained as
wishful thinking, it does not follow that all belief in God can be
accounted for in this way. And it certainly does not follow that
God does not exist, just because some persons believe in God
because of wishful thinking. So it may be the case that this person
should give up his present belief in God , but then go on to
consider whether the re are other grounds for such belief. To
simply abandon belief in God in this case would be much too hasty
a judgment on such an important matter.
Before moving on, perhaps we should pause to stress the point
that beliefs may be blameworthy because they lead to wrong
actions. This is especially so if wrong beliefs are deliberately
chosen, as in the Reformed view. For beliefs are a basis for action
and certain beliefs require certain actions. For instance, a bus
driver who is "appeared to treely" has an obligation to steer the
bus so as to avoid hitting the tree. If he chooses not to believe
there is a tree in front of him, he may wreck the bus and bring
harm to himself and his passengers. Likewise, a person who
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chooses not to believe in God may not perform the actions which
belief in God requires. This, I think, is the point of Calvin's claim
in the quote above, that persons who do not consecrate their lives
to God are morally accountable.
IV
Now let us turn to another account of religious belief and
rationality. In this section I want to consider the view that belief
in God is rationally supported by evidence and arguments. This
view has been recently defended by Richard Swinburne, who
argued in The Existence of God, that, on balance, it is more
probable than not that God exists. Once again, it is not my
purpose here to expound this view in detail, but only to consider
what implications it may have for the notion that belief in God is
an intellectual obligation.
In this view, the existence of God is not so starkly obvious, as
in the Reformed view. Rather, the situation is more ambiguous ,
but reason, if properly exercised, will lead us to conclude that God
exists. That is to say, God's existence is not immediately evident,
but we can quite properly infer it.
Interestingly, this view also, like the Reformed view, involves a
certain view of human nature. In the first place, reason points to
God's existence because reason is a gift of God.8 This is akin to
the Reformed idea that God has made us so that we have a strong
tendency to believe in Him. Here, however, it is not a direct
tendency so much as a faculty which , when properly exercised,
supports belief in God. Also akin to the Reformed view is the
notion that the world of nature justifies belief in God. Here,
however, nature does not simply trigger a disposition to believe.
Rather, it is part of the total evidence which reveals God, and can
be assessed by reason.
There is another assumption about human nature operating in
this view. It is that "all men want long-term well- being and deep
well-being: that is, they want to be for long in a supremely
worthwhile situation doing actions of great value."9 Such wellbeing, moreover, is o nly found through a relationship with God.
To sum up then, we have a God-given desire for deep and lasting
well-being. This desire can be satisfied only through knowledge of
God. And the evidence around us, when properly evaluated, will
lead us to belief in God.
With this background in place, let us go on to focus on the
question of how unbelief may be blameworthy in this view. The

first general suggestion here is that people who are uncertain of
God's existence should investigate whether there is a God and what
implications there might be for our lives if there is one. For, in
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our society at least, we are often confronted by the claims of
different religions which promise deep and eternal well-being to
their adherents. Since we naturally desire such well-being , it is
plausible to suppose that we should pursue the claims of religion to
find out whether any of them are in fact true. Moreover, it is
widely believed by "the man on the street" that there must be a
God. Even if this belief is not properly basic, it is still commonly
believed that God exists and that somehow He gives meaning to
life. Those who believe this ought to seek to find out what they
can about God and His purposes.
I am using the word "ought" here in a fairly strong sense. For
"if there is a God and he has made and sustains the world and
issued commands to men, men have moral obligations which they
would not otherwise have."10 Such commands might pertain to how
to use our lives, how to treat other people, how to treat the natural
order, and so on. We should want to discover whether there are
such commands, whether we have disobeyed them, whether we can
obtain forgiveness, and so forth.
Among man's duties is the duty to find out what his duties
are. He must therefore find out whether the world is his to
use as he pleases, or whether it belongs to someone else;
whether he is indebted to anyone for his existence, to whom
he owes acknowledgement and service. The duty to pursue
religious inquiry is a particular case of the duty to check that
we owe nothing to any man.11
So then, the general starting point here is the possibility that there
may be a God, that we may owe Him something by way of
obedience and worship, and that our ultimate well-being may
depend on knowledge of Him .
It is because these issues are so important that we are responsible
fo r having true beliefs about them. The more that is at stake in
something , the more important it is that we have true beliefs about
it. Given the importance of the issues which are at stake in
religion, it is incumbent upon us to seek the truth of the matter
wi th diligence and honesty.
It is not, however, easy to define exact standards for adequate
investigation. Consider the question of God's very existence. The
arguments surrounding this issue have been rather sophisticated for
some time. In our day, some of these have become so technical
that untrained persons could not possibly evaluate them. Is it then
necessary, if one is to investigate with integrity the question of
God's existence, that one must first undergo considerable
philosophical training?
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Surely not. The evidence regarding God's existence must be
such that a basic grasp of it can be had by untutored minds as well
as philosophers. Sophisticated arguments, we may suppose, only
spell out in greater detail what can be recognized by anyone at a
more intuitive level. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that all
persons may have an intelligent belief concerning God's existence.
However, religious inquiry cannot stop here. For if one comes
to believe there is a God, he should go on to find out more about
what God is like. What are His purposes? What is His will for
man?
Has God revealed himself in specific ways? To ask
questions such as these is to ask which, if any, specific religious
creed is true. And to ask this question is to raise again the
practicality of serious religious inquiry. For it would be virtually
impossible to make an exhaustive investigation of all religious
claims. Besides the major world religions, there are countless cults
and sects. The task of serious religious investigation may thus
seem impossible.
However, our investigator may plausibly assume that if there is
a God, the truth about Him is to be found in some religion which
has had substantial success in winning adherents throughout the
world. For the truth about something so essential to all men should
commend itself to a broad range of persons and not just an isolated
few.u
It is because we should seek more detailed knowledge of God
that beliefs about Christ are important. For the Christian claim is
that God's highest act of self-revelation was given through His Son,
who became incarnate in Christ. If Christ is God's Son, our
worship is due Him. Moreover, His teaching is essential for
knowing God's will which leads to our eternal well-being. Thus,
to fail to believe that Christ is God's Son may result in failure to
properly worship and obey God, and ultimately lead to a loss of
eternal well-being.
At any rate, investigators should gather what evidence and
information they can by reading, talking with adherents of
different religions, and so on. They should pursue the available
evidence and reflect on it until they reach a settled conviction
about which, if any, religious creed is true. Perhaps the key to
what is to count as sufficient investigation of religion is to be
determined by comparing the standards a person applies to other
matters. For:
Although a man may think that he has devoted enough time

to such investigation, even by his own standards he may not
have done . He may have devoted far less time to it than the
importance which he believed the matter to warrant by his
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normal standards of how much time you ought to devote to
investigating things.n
For instance, suppose a person painstakingly and thoroughly
researches all the options available before investing money.
Furthermore, he makes it a point to keep up with financial news
by regularly reading business reports, market analyses, and so on.
Suppose further that this person's religious beliefs are based on
investigation which is superficial and perfunctory compared to the
research on financial affairs. In this case, I think the person
involved could be held culpable for carelessness in forming wrong
beliefs on a matter of supreme importance. And carelessness on
such a matter is not easily excused.
Of course, this raises questions about cases of persons who
investigate religious matters carelessly, but who happen to come to
right beliefs anyway. And, on the other hand, there may be cases
of persons who are diligent in religious inquiry but who arrive at
erroneous beliefs. Perhaps in their investigation, they came across
only weak presentations of Christianity, but impressively argued
apologies for some other religion . In this case, it is hard to see
how a person could be faulted for not believing in Christ. Indeed,
perhaps in a situation like this it would be logically impossible for
a person honestly to believe in Christ, at least without further
research and reflection. Such a person should not, as Robinson put
it, "hypnotize" himself to believe, against his better judgment.
Certainly honesty is crucial to genuine religious inquiry. And
honesty requires us to be led in the direction the evidence points.
To refuse to be led by the evidence is blameworthy, especially if
one is wrongly motivated. For instance, a person may be inclined
by the evidence to believe in Christianity, but may refuse to do so
because he or she is unwitting to face up to the moral demands of
the Christian faith. As Swinburne comments:
Men have no doubt down the centuries cultivated unbelief or
allowed themselves to slide into atheism on various bad nonrational grounds--e.g. in order to be able to commit other
sins without a bad conscience. But this is surely one kind of
unbelief which the Christian religion has stigmatized as a
great sin. t4
Now then, let us summarize the argument of this section. I have
been sketching the grounds for holding that unbelief is culpable
given the assumption that the overall evidence shows not only that
it is probable that God exists, but that the more specific Christian
creed is true. The general idea here is that it is our duty to engage
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in religious inquiry because it is at least initially plausible that God
exists and we may have obligations to Him . Our ultimate wellbeing may depend on having true beliefs about God. To engage in
religious inquiry is not, however, to assume from the outset that
any religion is true.
Culpability may stem from two things: either failure to
investigate religious claims seriously or dishonesty in weighing the
evidence. If it is indeed true that the evidence supports not only
the existence of God, but also the Christian creed, then honest
investigation should lead most people to believe the Christian faith.
This assumes, of course, that the relevant evidence is accessible to
the investigator and that the collected evidence is representative.
That is, the evidence must accurately portray the religions in
question, and the amount of rational support they in fact enjoy.
Given these assumptions, belief in Christianity would be the
natural outcome of investigation. Not to believe in God, or to
believe in some other religion would have to be a choice made in
spite of good reason to believe otherwise. There is thus another
point of contact with the Reformed view: seeing unbelief as a
choice. The difference, of course, is that in the Reformed view
unbelief must fly in the face of an immediate, strong, natural
tendency to believe. In this view, the tendency to believe is not so
immediately strong, but results from investigation and reflection on
the evidence.
The move to blameworthiness is thus more tenuous and open to
objection at a number of points. The very first step may be
contested in that it may be doubtful whether we have a duty to
find out what obligations we may have to God if we are unsure
whether God even exists. Thus, one may simply opt out of
religious inquiry from the outset. If this decision is to be judged
culpable, it seems that it must be insisted that the initial obligation
to seek out our duties is fairly evident or intuitive.
Moreover, if it is to be claimed that unbelief is universally
culpable, then it must be maintained that there is evidence
universally available. Obviously, however, all the relevant evidence
is not evenly distributed. There are, for instance, numerous places
where Christianity has not spread. In such places, it is hard to see
how anyone could be held accountable for not believing in Christ.
This difficulty may be met by the suggestion that God only
holds us accountable for whatever evidence or information is in
fact available to us. This is not a modern expedient for an
embarrassing problem, but a reasonable response which has been

proposed by Christians of earlier generations. For instance, John
Wesley held that failure to believe in Christ is only blameworthy
among those to whom the gospel has been preached. He urged that
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we should leave the fate of others up to God, who can be trusted
to judge such men "according to the light they have ."15
If there is at least some "light" available to all persons in all
places and circumstances, then all may be required to have at least
a rudimentary belief in God. Fortunately, we can follow Wesley's
counsel and leave it in God's hands to determine how much belief
is required. But if it is true that some evidence is available to all,
then it is fairly clear that unbelief may be a choice which is
universally culpable.

v
As we noted at the outset, the line of argument we have been
considering is offensive to many. To think that anyone's beliefs
could be blameworthy even to the point of leading to damnation
may seem to bespeak a certainty, nay a dogmatism, which is not
only unwarranted but despicable as well.
Kant expressed this
sentiment in a rather pointed, but delightful passage:
The very man who has the temerity to say: He who does not
believe in this or that historical doctrine as a sacred truth,
that man is damned, ought to be able to say also: If what I
am now telling you is not true, let me be damned! Were there
an yo ne who could make such a dreadful declaration , I should
advise the conduct toward him suggested by the Persian
proverb concerning a hadji: If a man has been in Mecca once
(as a pilgrim), move out of the house in which he is living, if
he has been there twice, leave the street on which he is to be
found; but if he has been there three times, forsake the city
or even the lands which he inhabits!l6
Certainly the notion that religious beliefs may be blameworthy has
bred fanaticism , persecution , crusades and even wars. Kant is
right to point out that zeal for religious beliefs can be dangerous.
But what about Kant's assertion that no one should claim anyone
is damned for unbelief unless he is willing himself to be damned if
it turns out he is wrong? Again, I think Kant's point is well taken
if he means to remind us that judging the fate of others is not a
human prerogative. But beyond this, is it wrong to believe that
other persons may be damned because of their beliefs? Ironically,
Kant turns the table by suggesting that those who believe that the
beliefs of others are damnable, may themselves hold a damnable
belief!
But let us come back: is it wrong to believe others may be
damned because of their belief? In considering this question, it is
important to keep in mind that this belief is part of a larger web
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of beliefs, namely, the traditional beliefs of Christian theism.
More exactly, this belief follows from the beliefs that Christ is the
Son of God, that His teachings are authoritative, and that He
taught that unbelief is a sin which leads to damnation . If there is
nothing wrong in believing Christian theism in general, it will be
hard to show that it is wrong to believe this particular aspect of
Christian teaching.
I have also tried to emphasize in the discussion above that one's
beliefs are not isolated from one's behavior. Rather, they are the
basis for actions, values, attitudes, and so on. In short, they are an
integral aspect of a total way of life. Perhaps it is important to
understand something of this in order to rightly hold that beliefs
are blameworthy.
It is also important to grasp the connection between
blameworthiness and the ground of belief. Jn the accounts we
examined above, belief in God was grounded in such a way that
unbelief was a culpable choice. As we noted at the beginning,
those who think there is no positive reason to believe in God have
tended to abandon the claim that unbelief is blameworthy. I think
this is appropriate. Those who think the evidence is neutral, and
who do not think belief in God is properly basic, have no basis for
holding that unbelief is culpable. Even many Christian thinkers
grant that atheists can give perfectly rational explanations of
everything which requires explanation. If the evidence is thus
neutral, those who want to believe in God may have the right to
believe, but it is hard to see how anyone could have an obligation
to believe . But, on the other hand, those who think that belief in
God is properly basic or who think the evidence positively supports
belief in God can hardly avoid the implication that unbelief is
culpable.
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